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Abstract: China’s new round tenure reform has devolved collective forests to individuals on an
egalitarian basis. To balance the equity–efficiency dilemma, forestland transfers are highly advocated
by policymakers. However, the forestland rental market is still inactive after the reform. To examine
the role of off-farm employment in forestland transfers, a simultaneous Tobit system of equations
was employed to account for the endogeneity, interdependency, and censoring issues. Accordingly,
the Nelson–Olson two-stage procedure, embedded with a multivariate Tobit estimator, was applied
to a nationally representative dataset. The estimation results showed that off-farm employment plays
a significantly negative role in forestland rent-in, at the 5% risk level. However, off-farm activities
had no significant effect on forestland rent-out. Considering China’s specific situation, a reasonable
explanation is that households hold forestland as a crucial means of social security against the risk
of unemployment. In both rent-in and rent-out equations, high transaction costs are one of the
main obstacles impeding forestland transfer. A remarkable finding was that forestland transactions
occurred with a statistically significant factor equalization effect, which would be helpful to adjust
the mismatched labor–land ratio and improve the land-use efficiency.
Keywords: collective forest tenure reform; forestland transfer; off-farm employment;
simultaneous-equation Tobit model; efficiency
1. Introduction
China has approximately 120 million hectares of farmland, which is capable of feeding the Chinese
population of 1.3 billion people (http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/195/content-521780.
html.). By contrast, with 303 million hectares of forestland, China cannot provide sufficient timber
for domestic consumption, and its import dependency is high (48.31% of the total consumption
of timber in 2015) (http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/62/content-957369.html.). This highlights a
lower efficiency of forestland cultivation than that of farmland. China’s agricultural production and
productivity experienced remarkable growth after an institutional shift from the collective system
to the household-responsibility system in the early 1980s [1]. However, similar policies, named “the
Three Fixes”, were not implemented thoroughly in China’s forestry sector, partly due to ecological
considerations [2]. The forestry productivity has been severely impeded by institutional and regulatory
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barriers [3]. Therefore, a new round of tenure reform was initiated on collective forestland around
2003 [4], known as the collective forest tenure reform (CFTR). Two stages were involved: The first
stage was called the main-body reform and involved contracting collective-owned forestland to
individuals, with clarified and secure property rights for up to 70 years. The second stage is known
as the supplementary reform or the concomitant reform, which entitles households to transferability,
inheritance and mortgage rights [5]. Currently, the second-stage reform is still in progress.
In practice, the CFTR was conducted according to an egalitarian principle based on the family
headcount. This may create a mismatch between households’ production ability and forestland
size. To address this mismatch, forestland transfer among households has been strongly advocated
by the government. However, the State Forestry Administration (SFA) of China declared that only
2% of contracted forestland has been transferred between households, which is evidently less than
the transfer of farmland (30.4%) (http://www.forestry.gov.cn/Zhuanti/content_lqgg/800410.html.).
The incredibly low rate of transactions implies that the low efficiency of forestland management
might not be considerably improved through the CFTR, as it is hard to believe that efficiency could be
automatically reached under the egalitarian allocation scheme used in the CFTR. Therefore, to improve
efficiency in forestry, there is a pressing need to identify the main determinants of forestland transfers.
Much literature has focused on China’s farmland transfer, where off-farm employment is widely
emphasized as one of its crucial determinants [6–12]. The rationale is intuitive: households own
land only because the marginal income from farming cultivation is not less than that from their
alternative income sources. This implies that the off-farm activity can be considered to play an
important role in determining the land transfer decisions [13]. Unlike the abundance of farmland
transfer studies, there seem to be only two papers so far on the forestland rental market and the
related forestland transfer behavior (This argument is based on the search results from the Web of
Science (https://apps.webofknowledge.com, accessed on 10 May 2017), using TOPIC: (forestland
rental) and TOPIC: (China). Only papers written in English language and published in international
journals are reviewed here.). With 222 households in the Zhejiang province, Xu et al. [14] examined the
determinants of households’ decisions on forestland transfers. They found that off-farm employment
had significantly negative and positive effects, on rent-in and rent-out decisions, respectively (The term
“rent-in” means an action to transfer in more forestland from other households, while the term
“rent-out” refers to an action to lease out forestland to others. These two terms are commonly used
in previous literature [7]). However, with a larger sample of 701 households from three provinces,
Siikamäki et al. [15] found that the effect was significantly negative, no matter what the direction of
the transfer.
More importantly, both Xu et al. [14] and Siikamäki et al. [15] neglected the potential endogeneity
of off-farm employment. The forestland transfers and off-farm employment behaviors are decided
endogenously and simultaneously by farmers’ profit-maximization decisions, which require an
estimation of the simultaneous-equation model. In a paper on farmland transfers, Feng and Heerink [8]
realized this issue and employed a bivariate probit model to estimate a reduced form system of
equations. The reduced form setup implies that only exogenous variables are included on the
right-hand side of the equations, therefore, the effect of off-farm employment on land transfers cannot
be estimated directly. Instead, they used the sign of the correlation coefficient between error terms to
illustrate the relationship between these two behaviors. However, the setup of a bivariate model means
that the correlation coefficient only indicates whether one equation is correlated with others. It does
not produce the effect of one endogenous variable on other endogenous variables [16,17]. For instance,
in a paper on household water expenditure, Yoo [18] found that the sign of the correlation coefficient
between error terms of two behavioral equations and the sign of the effect between endogenous
variables of these equations can be opposite. Hence, using the signs of the correlation coefficients
to infer the effects of dependent variables on each other may be misleading. To obtain the effect of
off-farm employment on forestland transfer, a structural form or simultaneous-equation system model
should be established (Per Amemiya [16] and Roodman [19], we refer to the multivariate model in
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the sense that no endogenous variables appear on the right-hand sides of other equations, while
we refer to the simultaneous system of equations if the endogenous variables are included in other
equations. It can be found that the former model is a special case of the latter one.). Furthermore, the
low occurrence of forestland transfer implies that the dependent variable is censored. Therefore, this
paper employs a simultaneous-equation Tobit model to account for the endogeneity of off-farm work,
the interdependency across different equations, and the limited dependent variables.
Given the contradicting results and shortcomings in the statistical inferences of the previous
literature on forestland transfers, this paper aims to re-investigate the effect of off-farm employment on
forestland transfers with a nationally representative dataset. The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 presents the materials and methods, including the theoretical framework, estimation
approach, data source and descriptive statistics. Section 3 reports the empirical results and discusses
the findings. Section 4 concludes with policy implications.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Theoretical Model
For a representative household, the endowed amount of labor (L) is allocated between forestland
cultivation (LF) and off-farm work (LO) at an exogenously given wage (w). The possibility of hired
labor on forestland is excluded, as the local farm labor market is, in general, inactive and limited in
China [20]. According to Favada et al. [21], the households’ long-run forestry production function is
specified as f (LF, AF, Z)/T with standard properties, where AF represents forestland used in forestry
production, vector Z refers to households and village characteristics, and T is the rotation age of forests
(With regard to forestry production, the inputs of the current year will yield timber production after
T years. Theoretically, the harvesting can be sustainably continued under a normal forest, where
the annual logging volume can be deemed to be 1/T of the total output [22]). The existence of the
forestland tenancy market implies that the cultivated forestland AF is not necessarily equal to the
endowed area of forestland (A). Besides the land rent r, leasing of land incurs an additional transaction
cost (TC), which acts as a price wedge between the gain of renting out (r− TC) and the cost of renting
in (r + TC). Let Ain and Aout denote the amount of forestland rent-in and rent-out, respectively.
p represents the price of forestry products. The household decision is to allocate the endowed labor
and land to maximize the net benefits as follows (The agricultural production is not considered here.
For this paper, the household survey is conducted in the major forestry producing regions, where the
land cultivation is mainly related to forest management activities.):
max
LO ,Ain ,Aout
p× f (LF, AF, Z)/T + w× LO − Ain × rin + Aout × rout
s.t. AF = A + Ain − Aout, LF + LO = L
rin = r + TC, rout = r− TC
(1)
The first order conditions of Equation (1) yield the optimal allocation of labor and forestland, and
suggest the following structural form system of equations:
Ain = Ain(Aout, LO; p, w, r, TC, L, A, Z, T)
Aout = Aout(Ain, LO; p, w, r, TC, L, A, Z, T)
LO = LO(Ain, Aout; p, w, r, TC, L, A, Z, T)
(2)
2.2. Estimation Approach
The above equations illustrate that households’ decisions on forestland transfers and off-farm
employment are jointly determined. This feature implies that there exists potential interdependence
across the disturbances of respective equations. In this case, employing a univariate model to each
equation separately may generate biased parameters [23]. Moreover, the structural form specification
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in Equation (2) requires that one dependent variable be included in other equations as a regressor,
which induces a possibility of endogeneity. Furthermore, as shown in Section 2.4 below, a large
proportion of the sample households choose not to transfer forestland, which means the dependent
variables are censored. Therefore, the simultaneous-equation Tobit model is estimated to account for
the potential interdependent, endogenous and censored issues synchronously. In detail, the empirical
model corresponding to Equation (2) can be represented by:
A∗in,i = θ1L
∗
O,i + θ2 A
∗
out,i + α
′Xi + εin,i, Ain,i = max(0, A∗in,i)
A∗out,i = θ3L
∗
O,i + θ4 A
∗
in,i + β
′Xi + εout,i, Aout,i = max(0, A∗out,i)
L∗O,i = θ5 A
∗
in,i + θ6 A
∗
out,i + γ
′Xi + εO,i, LO,i = max(0, L∗O,i)
(3)
The reduced form of Equation (3) can be written as:
A∗in,i = φ
′Xi + uin,i, Ain,i = max(0, A∗in,i)
A∗out,i = τ
′Xi + uout,i, Aout,i = max(0, A∗out,i)
L∗O,i = ω
′Xi + uO,i, LO,i = max(0, L∗O,i)
(4)
where the superscript asteroid represents the unobservable latent variables. X is a vector of exogenous
variables, which includes a constant term and those listed in Equation (2). εin,i, εout,i and εO,i are
random disturbances that follow a multivariate normal distribution MVN(0, Ω), where Ω is the
covariance matrix with the correlation coefficients (vector ρ), between the error terms of the three
structural equations. The analogous definitions are applicable on uin,i, uout,i and uO,i. The unknown
parameters for endogenous variables in the structural form are denoted by θ1 ∼ θ6, and the vectors
of unknown parameters for exogenous variables in the model are denoted by α, β, and γ. The main
interests of this study are in the estimated values of θ′s.
To obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters, a two-stage simultaneous-equation
procedure, which is proposed by Nelson and Olson [24], is employed. The first stage is to regress the
reduced form equations (Equation (4) in this paper), and use the coefficient estimates of φ, τ, and ω to
generate the predicted values of latent dependent variables. At the second stage, the predicted values
of the latent variables are used as instruments on the right-hand sides of the structural form equations
(Equation (3) in this paper). Then, a Tobit approach can be applied to estimate the structural parameters.
The underlying rationale is that the created instruments are “at least asymptotically uncorrelated with
disturbance terms” [24], because only exogenous variables are included in the reduced form equations.
In practice, Nelson and Olson [24] applied the univariate Tobit method to estimate the reduced
form and the structural form equations with the predicted values of the endogenous latent variables,
from the first stage estimation of the reduced form. Thus, they neglected the possible joint
interdependence among different equations. This study employs a multivariate Tobit estimator,
embedded in the Nelson–Olson two-stage procedure, to test whether the multivariate setup is more
appropriate. The test is based on a fact that the univariate model is a special case of the multivariate one,
in the sense that the correlation coefficients ρ between the error terms of the simultaneous equations
are constrained to be zero [18]. Therefore, a z-test or likelihood ratio (LR) test can be conducted on the
multivariate regression with the null hypothesis of ρ = 0. If the corresponding statistics reject the null
hypothesis, then a multivariate Tobit estimator should be performed with the Nelson–Olson procedure
to attain more efficient estimates. Otherwise, the univariate model should be selected to separately
estimate each equation [25]. In this paper, the multivariate Tobit model is estimated by the maximum
simulated likelihood method, in order to avoid the complexity of high dimensional integrals [17].
Moreover, the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane simulator is used, and Halton sequences are employed, to
generate the multivariate normal random draws to reduce the computational burden [26].
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2.3. Data Source
The data was collected from an SFA-conducted, three-wave household survey. The information
was collected using face-to-face interviews and a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire
involved information on demographics, income, forestry production, off-farm employment activity
and forestland transfer participation. The first-wave survey was carried out in 2010, and obtained
the information of 2003 (pre-CFTR) and 2007–2009 (post-CFTR). The second and the third waves
were performed in 2012 and 2014, respectively, and collected the information from 2010 to 2013.
Nine provinces were selected, since they are the representatives of China’s major collective forest
regions. As depicted in Figure 1, the Liaoning province and the Sichuan province are in the northeast
and southwest forest regions, respectively. The Shandong and Henan provinces are the behalves of the
central forest region, while the remaining five provinces are in the southern forest region. The sample’s
geographical distribution means that our data can reflect the diversified characteristics of China’s
collective forest regions (For instance, among these nine provinces, the forest cover is between 16.7%
and 66.0%, and the area ratio of collective-owned forestland to total forestland is between 30% and
92% [27]. Regarding the economic development, the annual disposable income of rural household per
capita ranged from 1519.91 to 3391.72 USD (100 USD = 622.84 Yuan) in 2015 [28]).
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Figure 1. Spatial distribution of sample area. Note: Counties 1–18 are Mengyin, Laizhou, Wuyang,
Shihe, Qingyuan, Benxi, Weiyuan, Danleng, Suichang, Deqing, Shunchang, Shaxian, Pingjiang,
Hongjiang, Tonggu, Suichuan, Pingguo, and Huanjiang, respectively.
For each province, a stratified random sampling technique was adopted and two counties were
selected [29]. Then, three towns were randomly selected from these counties. Within each town,
three villages were randomly chosen, and around 10–15 farmers were investigated in each village.
We merged the three-wave surveys into a large dataset. Those with incomplete records or inconsistent
information in the questionnaire were dropped. Finally, the sample that was used in this study was
comprised of 1497 households, each of whom had 8 observations in 2003, and from 2007 to 2013.
2.4. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 illustrates that China’s forestland rental market is at an immature stage. Our sample
showed that by 2013, only 5.48% (82/1497) and 2.74% (41/1497) of households had transferred in
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and out their forestland, far behind that of farmland transfers. For the households with positive
observations on forestland transfers, the average rent-in area was 79.52 mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare),
which is around 3.7 times that of the average rent-out area. The big difference reflects a specific
mentality associated with Chinese peasants. That is, the land is usually deemed as the “lifeblood” for
rural families [11], hence households tend to be very cautious on their forestland asset, and would
not transfer them out rashly. Off-farm employment is measured in the data by the ratio of off-farm
income to household total income. Generally, the efforts engaged in off-farm activities and forestland
management can be reckoned as substitutes. Therefore, the off-farm employment is expected to impose
negative and positive effects on rent-in and rent-out, respectively. Of the whole sample, nearly half
of household income is from off-farm activities (see Table 1). It is worth noting that the rate is up
to 60.36% for the rent-out households, and is significantly higher than that of autarkic households
at the 5% statistical level. This provides preliminary evidence that households with more off-farm
employment are more likely to transfer out their forestland.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression.
Unit Full Sample
Sub-Sample by Household Type
Rent-In Autarky Rent-Out
Endogenous variables
Rent-in area mu 0.54 (13.47) 79.52 (143.02) N.A. N.A.
Rent-out area mu 0.07 (2.57) N.A. N.A. 21.50 (38.70)
Off-farm employment % 49.80 (34.13) 48.69 (34.65) 49.77 (34.12) 60.36 (37.07) **
Exogenous variables
Market variables
Transaction cost / 0.22 (0.86) 0.05 (0.09) *** 0.23 (0.87) 0.06 (0.05) ***
Timber price Yuan/m3 427.06 (97.24) 476.02 (97.16) 426.65 (97.17) 448.08 (92.35) *
Wage rate Yuan/day 48.97 (19.42) 49.63 (13.75) 48.92 (19.44) 60.91 (21.31) ***
Forestland attributes
Foreland area 34.91 (66.76) 36.21 (45.69) *** 34.82 (66.84) 59.35 (74.56) ***
Area per plot mu/plot 12.28 (21.73) 10.19 (10.23) 12.27 (21.79) 18.63 (22.12) ***
Household attributes
Age Years 51.08 (10.91) 45.88 (9.46) *** 51.11 (10.91) 52.00 (12.86)
Education Years 7.35 (2.76) 8.41 (2.56) *** 7.35 (2.76) 6.85 (2.97)




23.18 30.74 ** 23.11 28.70 **
(30.86) (36.05) (30.83) (28.02)
Household size Persons 3.98 (1.47) 4.20 (1.32) 3.98 (1.47) 3.78 (1.49)
Village attributes
Mountain 0/1 0.56 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
Road 0/1 0.72 (0.45) 0.55 (0.50) *** 0.72 (0.45) 0.85 (0.36) *
County distance km 35.14 (30.83) 34.94 (30.24) 35.17 (30.82) 28.62 (33.54) **
Observations / 11,976 82 11,853 41
Note: All price indexes have been deflated by the locally rural consumer price index (1994 = 100). Area per plot is
calculated based on the forestland area before transfer. The standard deviation is reported in parentheses. Taking the
autarky group as the benchmark, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed to compare the sample mean between
different subgroups. *, ** and *** denote a statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively [7,9].
N.A. means not applicable. The transaction cost is denoted by an index, hence the unit is not reported.
Equation (1) indicates the exogenous variables that potentially affect forestland transfer decisions,
as listed in Table 1. For transaction cost (TC), the inverse of village-average forestland area per
household, proposed by Kimura et al. [30], is used as a proxy, and the coefficient is expected to be
negative [31] (The rationale is intuitive: Given a certain amount of forestland that one desires to transfer,
if the average forestland area per household within that village is smaller, then more households would
be involved in transactions, hence the search and negotiation costs are higher [29]. It can be found that
a higher village-average land size per household indicates a lower transaction cost. To make them
logically consistent while keeping the magnitude of the estimated coefficient unchanged, we take an
inverse and logarithm operation on the index, i.e., ln (1/x) = −ln x.). The timber price (p) and wage
rate (w) are measured by the average level in local counties. The forestland (A) endowment variable is
represented by the forestland area before transfer. Unluckily, no efficient information was collected on
the forestland rent fee (r). As Jin and Deininger [32] argue, the land rent is a function of the local wage
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rate, transaction cost and land endowment, etc. Given these factors have been included in our model,
the rent fee should not be added again to avoid multicollinearity.
Vector Z consists of the household and village characteristics, as displayed in Table 1. The age
and the education level refer to the household head. The leadership variable is equal to one if
household members hold a cadre position in local government. If the village is in a mountainous
region and the roads in that village are paved with asphalt-related materials, then the mountain
and road variables are equal to one, respectively. Otherwise, the above three dummy variables are
equal to zero. The forestland fragmentation variable is also included in the model since previous
literature indicates that it affects production [33]. According to Tan et al. [34], the fragmentation level is
indexed by the forestland size per plot. It should be noted that a higher value of the forestland area per
plot indicates less fragmented land, while a lower value implies more fragmented land. The county
distance variable is denoted by the distance from that village to the closest county. The Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests suggest that, compared with the autarky group, both rent-in and rent-out groups
present significant differences on numerous covariates. For instance, no matter what the direction
of transfer, the transaction cost associated with rented households is significantly lower than that of
non-rented households at the 1% statistical level.
Regarding the rent-in equation, the signs of the estimated coefficients of timber price, household
member size, household income, forestland area per plot, mountain, and distance to the closest county
are expected to be positive. The coefficients of wage rate, forestland area, and road variables are
expected to be negative. The signs for other parameters are ambiguous. Due to the mirror image
phenomenon [7], the coefficient signs are anticipated to be reversed for the rent-out equation. For the
rotation period variable (T), the tree species within the same county should be similar. Hence, the
county dummies are introduced to denote the rotation period variable. Another benefit of introducing
these county dummies is that the unobservable heterogeneity can be captured by the regional dummies,
at least to some extent [9]. Considering the sample ranged from 2003 to 2013, the year dummies are also
included in the model, to capture the unobservable year-specific effects. In practice, the Huber–White
robust estimator of variance is calculated for appropriate inference [35].
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Model Specification Tests
To make the structural equations identifiable, following Feng and Heerink [8], labor size
(able-bodied, between 16 and 65 years old) and household member size were introduced into the
off-farm employment equations and into the forest land transfer equations, respectively, as proxies
for a theoretical labor endowment variable (L). Furthermore, two fragmentation indices, denoted by
the area per plot, were calculated based on the area before and after rent. These were taken into the
forestland transfer equations and the off-farm employment equations, respectively. The quadratic term
of forestland area was only included in the rent-in equation, not in the other two equations. Therefore,
in each equation, there were at least two exogenous variables absent from the other two equations.
Thus, the structural equations were identified [36].
As indicated in Table 2, the multivariate Tobit specification is tested against the univariate
specification. In the trivariate case, the LR joint test of ρ cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
correlations across different equations are all equal to zero, both in the reduced and structural form
equations. This implies that Equation (3) does not need to be estimated in a systematic fashion.
However, as an alternative, the z test suggests the ρ13 is statistically different from zero at the 5%
significant level, both in the reduced and structural form equations. Therefore, we further investigate
the cross-equation correlations in a bivariate-equation Tobit model, i.e., combine rent-in equation and
rent-out equation with off-farm employment equation, respectively. Table 2 shows that both z test and
LR test cannot reject the null hypothesis that ρ13 = 0 (ρ23 = 0) for rent-in (rent-out) in the bivariate case.
The trivariate and bivariate tests defensibly illustrate the across-equation interdependencies are not a
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serious problem for the data used in this paper, and the univariate Tobit approach is more appropriate
to estimate the system of Equation (3), as Nelson and Olson [24] proposed. Hereafter, the discussion is
based on the traditional Nelson-Olson two-stage procedure, where the three equations in Equation (3)
are estimated separately.
Table 2. Cross-equation correlations tests.








ρ12 −0.37 (0.32) −0.42 (0.44)
ρ13 −0.07 (0.03) −0.06 (0.05) −0.07 (0.03) −0.07 (0.05)
ρ23 0 (0.04) 0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.07)
z test
−1.15<0.25> −0.96<0.34>
−1.99<0.05> ** −1.37<0.17> −2.24<0.03> ** −1.55<0.12>
0.1<0.92> 0.19<0.85> 0.35<0.73> 0.33<0.74>
LR test 4.26<0.24> 2.01<0.16> 0.04<0.84> 5.02<0.17> 2.51<0.11> 0.13<0.72>
Note: The subscript 1, 2, and 3 denote equations of rent-in, rent-out, and off-farm employment, respectively. The
p-value and the Huber-White robust standard error is reported in angle brackets and in parentheses, respectively.
For trivariate model, the LR test is a joint test of ρ12 = ρ13 = ρ23 = 0. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
3.2. Determinants of Forestland Rent-In
The Nelson–Olson estimates of Equation (3) are reported in Table 3, and the associated average
partial effects (APE) are displayed in Table 4 (As stated in Section 2.2, in the first stage of the
Nelson–Olson procedure, the reduced form system (Equation (4)) is estimated to generate the
instruments of endogenous variables. For the sake of brevity, the estimation results of Equation (4) are
not reported here, but are available from the authors upon requests). As expected, the effect of off-farm
employment on forestland rent-in is negative, and significant at the 5% statistical level. That is, more
off-farm employment is associated with less forestland rent-in. Moreover, the APE shows that a 1%
increase in off-farm income rate would induce a decrease of forestland rent-in by 1.04 mu. As Section 2.1
argues, more off-farm employment restricts the availability of labor in forestland cultivation, hence
lowering the propensity to transfer-in forestland. This is particularly the case for China, where the large
rural–urban income disparity, and the remarkable earning gap between agricultural and industrial
sectors, render off-farm employment and migration attractive [37,38]. The preference for off-farm
work can be justified by the fact that, of the whole sample, the off-farm income accounted for half of
household total income (Table 1), and presents a trend with an increase from 43.60% in 2003 to 55.76%
in 2013. This phenomenon partially explains why the majority of households have not transferred in
more forestland.
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Table 3. Estimation results of the simultaneous-equation Tobit model.
Rent-In Rent-Out Off-Farm Employment
Rent-in −0.05 (0.00) *** −0.01 (0.00) ***
Rent-out −2.52 × 10−4 (1.61 × 10−4) 0.01 (0.01) ***
Off-farm employment −14.78 (6.45) ** −0.01 (0.06)
Transaction cost −67.81 (21.64) *** −11.36 (1.04) *** 0.34 (0.46)
Timber price 0.59 (0.22) *** −0.12 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) ***
Wage rate 0.48 (2.46) 0.38 (0.05) *** 0.24 (0.05) ***
Foreland area −1.36 (0.58) ** 0.12 (0.02) *** −0.04 (0.01) ***
Forestland area square −8.12 × 10−4 (2.26 × 10−3)
Area per plot 1.12 (0.47) ** −0.99 (0.11) *** −0.01 (0.03)
Age −6.68 (8.14) −5.38 (0.07) *** −0.43 (0.25) *
Age square 0.01 (0.08) 0.05 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)
Education 11.27 (5.45) ** −1.72 (0.41) *** 0.57 (0.15) ***
Leadership 33.56 (25.75) 12.89 (2.51) *** 0.46 (0.84)
Household income 1.21 (0.47) *** −0.02 (0.04) 0.07 (0.02) ***
Household size 27.71 (10.95) ** −3.92 (0.79) *** 2.21 (0.32) ***
Mountain −67.24 (43.15) −9.53 (2.90) *** −5.10 (0.89) ***
Road −74.58 (29.31) ** 15.46 (3.36) *** −1.38 (1.09)
County distance −0.66 (0.48) 0.03 (0.05) −0.01 (0.01)
Constant −431.10 (282.99) −410.12 (3.73) *** 30.97 (6.84) ***
Joint F test of county dummies 0.90 2584.54 *** 65.72 ***
Joint F test of year dummies 1.22 118.93 *** 9.85 ***
Uncensored/Censored number 82/11,894 41/11,935 9967/2009
Note: The Huber–White robust standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote a statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively [7,9]. Year and county dummies are included. For the sake of brevity,
their coefficients are not reported, but are available upon request to authors.
In line with theoretical expectation, Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that transaction cost has a negative
effect on forestland rent-in, and is significant at the 1% statistical level. The magnitude of its marginal
effect (−4.77) highlights the crucial role of transaction cost in farmers’ rent-in decisions. Similarly,
forestland area before transfer, and road conditions in the local village, also impose a negative effect on
rent-in, both of which are significant at the 5% risk level. For forestland area, the negative sign suggests
that the direction of forestland transactions is from households with larger forestland endowments to
those with smaller ones, i.e., the rental market tends to equalize cultivated forestland and balance the
disparities among households [39]. Through transfer, the amount of forestland available to land-poor
households will increase. These findings suggest that the land lease market can reach the same results
as the administrative reallocation does, at least as far as equity is concerned, and strongly supports
a so-called factor equalization effect [32]. To further examine the existence of economies of scale, the
squared term of forestland area is introduced. The coefficient is not statistically significantly different
from zero, which implies households’ behavior of forestland rent-in is unlikely due to the motivation of
economies of scale. Good road and transportation conditions in local regions could facilitate villagers
to travel outside and seek off-farm employment opportunities [40,41], thus playing a negative role in
households’ decision on forestland rent-in. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2.4, a lower value of
the average plot size indicates more fragmented forestland. Therefore, the positive sign of average plot
size indicates that forestland fragmentation has a negative effect on forestland rent-in. The underlying
reason may be that fragmentation increases production costs, hampers technical efficiency, thereby
diminishing the profitability of land cultivation [33,34].
Sustainability 2017, 9, 1645 10 of 14
Table 4. Average partial effects based on expected values of truncated outcomes.
Rent-In Rent-Out Off-Farm Employment
Rent-in −0.003 (0.001) *** −0.009 (0.003) ***
Rent-out −1.77 × 10−5 (1.13 × 10−5) 0.010 (0.004) ***
Off-farm employment −1.040 (0.456) ** −0.001 (0.004)
Transaction cost −4.771 (1.532) *** −0.686 (0.260) *** 0.238 (0.319)
Timber price 0.042 (0.015) *** −0.007 (0.002) *** 0.013 (0.004) ***
Wage rate 0.034 (0.173) 0.023 (0.010) ** 0.165 (0.036) ***
Foreland area −0.096 (0.041) ** 0.008 (0.003) ** −0.028 (0.007) ***
Forestland area square −5.72 × 10−5 (1.59 × 10−4)
Area per plot 0.079 (0.033) ** −0.060 (0.012) *** −0.008 (0.020)
Age −0.470 (0.574) −0.325 (0.090) *** −0.304 (0.173) *
Age square 0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.002)
Education 0.793 (0.382) ** −0.104 (0.006) *** 0.398 (0.102) ***
Leadership 2.361 (1.798) 0.778 (0.374) ** 0.320 (0.590)
Household income 8.50 × 10−5 (3.33 × 10−5) ** −1.14 × 10−6 (1.96 × 10−6) 4.77 × 10−5 (1.44 × 10−5) ***
Household size 1.949 (0.768) ** −0.237 (0.021) *** 1.552 (0.225) ***
Mountain −4.731 (3.029) −0.576 (0.042) *** −3.575 (0.626) ***
Road −5.247 (2.033) *** 0.934 (0.471) ** −0.966 (0.761)
County distance −0.046 (0.034) 0.002 (0.004) −0.006 (0.010)
Note: The average partial effects are calculated based on the data of households with positive observations on
dependent variables. The standard error is reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote a statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively [7,9].
Contrary to the above-mentioned negative effects, Tables 3 and 4 also illustrate the factors that
would promote forestland rent-in. For instance, the positive and statistically significant coefficient
for timber price suggests that the demand for rental land is likely to be higher when the timber price
increases, because of a higher rate of return on forestland investment. Likewise, the household size also
has a positive effect, and is significant at the 1% risk level. The positive sign indicates that forestland
is being transferred from households with fewer family members to the ones with more members.
Combined with the above-mentioned forestland area effect, it can be found that the rental market is
moving forestland from those with less labor and more land to those with more labor and less land, a
result that is in line with Huang et al. [9], regarding China’s farmland rental market. This phenomenon
illustrates that the discrepancy of the labor–forestland ratio among households can be reduced, and
further implies that the forestland rental market is likely to improve the efficiency of factor allocation,
at least to some extent. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of education and income
variables are consistent with our theoretical anticipations.
3.3. Determinants of Forestland Rent-Out
A surprising finding is that off-farm employment had no statistically significant effect on
forestland rent-out, which is inconsistent with the theoretical expectation. This result indicates that
there might be other reasons that influence households’ rent-out decisions, and restrict the role of
off-farm employment. One plausible reason is associated with the social security function of land.
In Chinese history, the land is usually deemed as a “lifeline” or “lifeblood” by peasants and performs
a pivotal function as a social safety net in peasants’ livelihoods [11,42]. Currently, temporality is an
important feature of rural–urban migration flow in China, partly because the existing household
registration system hinders rural peasants to settle down permanently in cities [43]. Given the
institutional constraints, peasants who undertake off-farm work are expelled from the urban social
security system. Thus, they must enroll in the rural social security services at their local villages,
which is widely considered as an unsound system [44]. Therefore, households are inclined to hold
their forestland, and use it as a means of livelihood insurance to respond to the jeopardy of losing
jobs. This motivation neutralizes the positive effect of off-farm employment on rent-out, leading to a
statistically insignificant coefficient.
At the same time, the forestland rent-out behavior is found to be negatively affected by that
of rent-in, which is significant at the 1% risk level. The sign is consistent with our expectation,
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since, theoretically, households will not transfer in and out at the same time [30]. As anticipated,
the transaction cost variable has a negative effect on rent-out, with a significance at the 1% risk
level. It is noteworthy that the same argument is also found for the estimation of rent-in behavior.
Among other variables, an intriguing mirror-image phenomenon is observed [7], i.e., the signs are
reversed between rent-in and rent-out estimation. These mirror-image and statistically significant
variables involve timber price, forestland area, fragmentation, education, household size, and road
condition. The mirror-image phenomenon results from the fact that rent-in and rent-out are two
opposite sides of the transfer action. Thus, the underlying rationale explaining the rent-in decisions
can also be applied to interpret the rent-out decisions. Therefore, we do not continue to explain the
rationale of the estimated signs of these mirror-image variables, as they have been discussed above in
the rent-in case (Section 3.2).
It should be noted that there are several variables in which the status of statistical significance
is changed between the rent-in and the rent-out estimations. For instance, the coefficients of wage,
age, leadership, and mountain are not significantly different from zero in the rent-in equation, but
they indeed refuse the null hypotheses in the rent-out case, at the 5% or 1% risk level. By contrast,
household income has a significant effect on the rent-in activity, but not on the rent-out behavior.
These findings indicate that the forestland rent-in and rent-out decisions are somehow distinct and
asymmetric [9]. These asymmetric variables are basically consistent with theoretical expectations.
For example, an increase of wage rate makes the opportunity cost of forestland management become
higher, hence, imposing a positive effect on forestland rent-out. For the leadership variable, cadres
are usually the capable persons in local communities in rural China and are endowed with more
social capital and wider social networks. With these social connections, for households with cadre
members, it is relatively easier to find and obtain off-farm opportunities [45], thus they prefer leasing
out forestland. A significant U-shaped relationship is found between household age and forestland
rent-out, which suggests that households with younger and elder heads are more likely to rent out
forestland. The intuitions underlying these two groups are distinctive. The younger household
heads are inclined to undertake off-farm employment [46], while elder ones lease out their forestland,
probably due to physical unaffordability to cultivate it. The turning point in the effect of age is around
54 years.
3.4. Determinants of Off-Farm Employment
Given that off-farm employment significantly influences rent-in behavior, we are also interested in
the factors that determine households’ decisions about off-farm employment. In line with theoretical
expectations, wage rate had a positive effect on off-farm employment decisions and is significant
at the 1% statistical level. The comparison of the numerical size of coefficients in Table 4 highlights
that wage rate is a crucial determinant, as well as household member size. Another important
factor refers to the education of the household head, which is significant at the 1% statistical level.
The positive sign suggests that well-educated farmers have advantages to obtain more off-farm work
opportunities. The magnitudes of coefficients also illustrate that the mountain variable is a critical
factor that negatively affects the off-farm behavior at the 1% significance level. Other things being
equal, the ratio of off-farm income to total income in the mountainous regions is 3.58% lower than that
of the plain regions, based on the estimated coefficient. The life-cycle effect is not supported empirically,
and the significantly negative sign of age suggests that the younger farmers are more inclined to engage
in the off-farm sector. Other significant variables are basically consistent with theoretical anticipations.
It is worth noting that both rent-in and rent-out significantly influence off-farm employment at the
1% significance level. As expected, rent-in forestland would decrease the possibility to work in the
off-farm sector, while rent-out would stimulate this likelihood.
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4. Conclusions
Drawing upon a nationally representative household survey, this paper investigated the effect
of off-farm employment on forestland transfer decisions. With a framework of households’ optimal
decisions on labor and forestland allocation, there exists a bi-directional causality between off-farm
employment and forestland transfers. This brings about the issues of potential endogeneity and
possible interdependence. Moreover, the fact that the majority of households in our sample did not
transfer their forestland means that we are dealing with a problem of a censored dependent variable.
Hence, a simultaneous-equation Tobit model was needed to account for endogeneity, interdependency
and censoring. The Nelson–Olson two-stage estimates showed that households’ forestland rent-in
decisions were negatively affected by off-farm employment, and that the effect was significant at the
5% statistical level. The magnitude of APE (−1.04) suggests that off-farm employment is a crucial
factor that impedes the expansion in demand of the forestland rental market.
A policy-oriented dilemma can be derived from this finding. That is, urban–rural integration
or urbanization has become a nationwide strategy following the release of “The National New-Type
Urbanization Plan (2014–2020)” by the Chinese Central Government (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/
2014-03/16/content_2640075.htm.). In this strategy, off-farm employment and migration are highly
encouraged and supported by governments, thus indicating a rise in off-farm income rate. Based on
our finding, this trend would reduce the amount of rent-in, which implies the forestland rental market
might remain, or become more, inactive in future. Therefore, the Chinese government encounters a
dilemma between the development of the rural–urban economy and the establishment of the forestland
rental market. The policymakers should—when dealing with the rural excessive labor issue through
the New-Type Urbanization strategy—also pay much attention to the rural land issue. The efforts to
resolve rural labor problems may impose an extra and unexpected cost on the rural land problem. Both
labor and land are fundamental endowments for rural households, thus policy interventions aimed at
either of the two aspects should be based on the cost-benefit analysis of both. For the following second
stage of the CFTR, how to balance the above-mentioned dilemma is a big challenge for policymakers.
We found that off-farm work has no significant effect on rent-out. This unexpected result might
be caused by China’s specific conditions. In urban China, migrants cannot enroll in the urban social
security system due to a restriction of the household registration system. In rural China, the social
security system is relatively weak and incomplete. Under these circumstances, although households
engage in the industrial sector, they are still inclined to hold their forestland as a means of social
security to avoid the risk of unemployment. Therefore, to stimulate households to transfer out their
forestland, the governments should pay more attention to adjusting the household registration system
and improve the rural social security services. Besides off-farm employment, we find the transaction
cost is a crucial obstacle to the development of the forestland rental market, regardless of the rent-in
or rent-out behaviors. This conclusion reflects that, currently, the transaction cost during forestland
transfers might still be high, even though the first stage of the CFTR is concluding. For policymakers,
how to reduce the transaction cost of forestland transfers should be one of the main concerns in
the second stage of the CFTR. An outstanding finding is that forestland is being transferred from
households with less labor and more forestland, to those with more labor and less forestland. This factor
equalization effect indicates that forestland transfers might be a feasible way to achieve the dual goals
of equity and efficiency. Therefore, supportive policies to facilitate the functioning of the forestland
rental market should be put forward in the following steps of the CFTR.
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